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Abstract 
CAG has constitutional mandate to audit the accounts of Union and States and is to submit 
audit reports to Parliament and State assemblies to ensure that executive is accountable to 
legislatures on public finance management.  In the backdrop of recent indigestible reports divulging 
massive plundering of public funds and resources, the article focuses on what procedure needs to be 
adopted by the Executive to select the CAG who has duty and powers   to question wisdom of the 
government in expenditure management.  The paper also examines what could be the selection 
method to appoint CAG so that one is able to function towards constitutional responsibility without 
favour and fear. This article explores whether there exists an explicit and transparent system for 
appointing the CAG and whether that system facilitates one to remain non-partisan and independent 
eliminating ‘conflict of interest’ and ‘obligations of reciprocity’, and furthermore, as well, examines 
the needs for constitutional amendments and other legislative changes in the relevant laws. 
 
Introduction 
 Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG) have been considered as an organ of the 
Government and public was mostly ignorant about its role and functions.  Like Election Commission 
was awaken from its slumber by T. N. Seshan
1
 in early 1990s and changed the ways elections were 
held in India, Vinod Rai
2
, in recent past, made the office of CAG prominently known to public and 
changed this notion that it is a component of government, and rather established that it functions as 
National Auditor and ensures that executive is accountable to legislature regarding the financial 
management of Union and States.   Audit Reports from CAG on Coal mines allocation, 2G Spectrum, 
Common Wealth Games, KG-D6 Gas Block etc. are the ample proofs that exposed the Government 
towards mismanagement of public funds and of natural resources distribution aiming at profiting 
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certain private parties. Judiciary came into motion through public interest litigation and many 
politicians and bureaucrats were sent behind bar, spectrum licences were cancelled and government 
was directed to auction the spectrum. Such revelations influenced the public mind and altered, to 
some extent, the political outcome.  
CAG is now fairly considered as custodian of public purse. Judiciary has also shown deep 
faith and confidence in the institution in various judicial pronouncements. Last week itself, Supreme 
Court has asked CAG to find out where the money has gone that was collected by center and various 
states for construction workers welfare and directed to submit audit report
3
. Apex court has assigned 
the task of verifying the claim of the Noida Toll Bridge Company
4
  whether they have not yet 
recovered the total project cost and, has appointed a Committee
5
 headed by Ex-CAG to smoothly 
implement the Lodha penal reforms in BCCI to cleanse the ills in cricket administrative machinery. 
Appointment of CAG in current scenario - Legal Challenges:- 
 Comptroller and Auditor General of India
6
 has been created as a constitutional body to assure   
that executive is answerable to Parliament and State assemblies on use of public funds and resources  
and  it actually performs the functions of custodian of public money.  Article 148 of Constitution
7
 
stipulates that CAG shall be appointed by President and he can be removed from office in like 
manner and on the like grounds as a Judge of the Supreme Court.   CAG has been given a status of 
Supreme Court judge.  
Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, Chairman of the Drafting Committee stated in the Constituent Assembly 
that CAG is ―probably the most important officer in the Constitution of India. If this functionary is to 
                                                          
3




 Noida Toll Bridge Company v Federation of Noida Residents Welfare Association, (2016)11JT 1. 
5
 Krishnadas Rajagopal, Committee led by former CAG Vinod Rai to run BCCI. (Mar.07, 2017, 8:10 PM) 
http://www.thehindu.com/sport/cricket/Committee-led-by-former-CAG-Vinod-Rai-to-run-BC CI/article17116632.ece.  
6
 Art.148. Comptroller and Auditor-General of India.—(1) There shall be a Comptroller and Auditor-General of India 
who shall be appointed by the President by warrant under his hand and seal and shall only be removed from office in like 
manner and on the like grounds as a Judge of the Supreme Court. 
7
  Ibid.  
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carry out the duties – and his duties, I submit, are far more important than the duties of even of the 
judiciary – he should have been certainly as independent as the Judiciary.‖
8
 
The question arises whether existing constitutional provisions and procedure to appoint CAG 
is robust and independent enough so that appointment remains beyond the influence of executive as 
one is to ascertain the responsibility of Union and States towards financial administration of public 
resources. 
The appointment of CAG is solely an executive function requiring no consultation with 
anybody or even to PAC (Parliamentary Accounts Committee) that has to examine audit reports in 
determining the executive accountability on public expenditure management. Appointment is 
exclusively at the mercy and whims of executive and cannot be said, in any manner, to be free from 
influences of executive. Human Nature being susceptible, CAG so appointed exclusively by 
government may feel under obligations towards executive and may attempt to reciprocate obligations 
in compromising the audit reports. There is no transparent and definite system prevalent in appointing 
such constitutional authority who is entrusted with such responsibility of monitoring huge public 
resources. In the changing times of liberalized economy when national resources are shared with 
private entities to achieve faster economic development and in the backdrop of politico- bureaucratic 
nexus in marauding the public resources in the form of various scams, there is a danger in continuing 
the existing system of appointment of CAG solely by executive that creates ‗obligations of 
reciprocity‘ amongst them and may compromise the independence of CAG. CAG has been kept at 
par with Supreme Court Judge but appointment system totally differs that gives leverage to executive. 
Judges of Supreme Court and High Courts are also appointed by President after consultation
9
 with 
judiciary. This consultation with judiciary has been converted into ‗concurrence’
10
 of judiciary by 
various judicial pronouncements using the basic structure theory - independence of judiciary- and 
inventing new system of ‗Collegium‘ thereby eliminating the executive primacy in appointing judges. 
However, executive supremacy exits in selecting CAG. Viewing the role of CAG in control of public 
                                                          
8
  Constituent Assembly Debate, Vol. III, pp. 407-8 
9
  Indian Constitution: Art. 124, cl.2. and Art.217, cl.1. 
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  Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record - Association v. Union of India.(1993) 4 S.C.C. 441. In re Special Reference 1 of 
1998.  (1998)  7 S.C.C. 739. 
 
 
An International Refereed e-Journal 
                        (Peer Reviewed, Refereed & Open Access, Index, Journal of Law) 
Web: www.lrdjournal.com,    Email: journal1257@gmail.com 
 
[95] 
Vol. 1, Issue-III 
March 2017 
funds by constitution framers, although CAG was well thought-out to be independent at par with 
judiciary, but CAG did not have that luxury of ‗constitutional powers‘ to alter its appointing 
procedure in the changing times as has been developed in case of judiciary. 
Comptroller and Auditor General‘s (Duties, Powers and Conditions of Service) Act, 1971, 
herein further referred as CAG Act,  provides provisions regarding salary, terms of office, leave, 
pension and other service conditions which cannot be altered detrimental to him after his tenure, 
which definitely helps CAG to function independently without interference from executive, but it 
speaks nothing about the system of appointing CAG thereby leaving the appointing arena entirely to 
the fancy of executive. There seems no credible justification coming forward in not determining the 
appointing procedure in that piece of legislation. The conclusion becomes obvious that executive 
definitely wants to have free hand in such appointment.  Due to obvious reasons, Executive would 
not like to appoint such person who could make indigestible audit reports revealing mismanagement 
of public funds. Thus, appointment system of CAG can‘t be said to be beyond manipulation, and is 
under full control of executive. 
Appointment of Supreme Audit Institute (SAI) in other countries. 
The Office of National Auditors is known as Supreme Audit Institute (SAI) in international 
parlance. There is no single uniform method in appointing the SAI, which can be replicated in India 
and such procedures to appoint the head or governing body of the Supreme Audit Institution (SAI) 
are at variance. 
In Austria, Spain, Denmark, Finland and Belgium, the lawmakers have sole powers to appoint 
the SAI,
11




In United Kingdom, Ireland, Luxembourg, Germany and the Netherlands national auditors are 
selected with the participation of legislature and the executive both.
13
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In Japan, Board of Audit comprising three Commissioners is appointed by the Cabinet with the 





 the President appoints Comptroller General with the advice and consent of the 
Senate.  An independent commission is constituted by the Congress to recommend individual to the 
President for appointing the Comptroller General who heads the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO), an agency within the legislative branch of the federal government. 
Auditor-General for Australia is an independent officer of the Parliament and is appointed by 
the Governor-General, - a representative of monarch- on the recommendation of the Joint Committee 
of Public Accounts and Audit (JCPAA) and the Prime Minister.
16
 Controller and Auditor-General in 
New Zealand is appointed by the Governor-General on the recommendation of the legislature.
17
 
A successful system in one country may not be fruitful in another nation for efficacy of 
selection methods of such constitutional heads would depend entirely on constitutional ideals 
experienced in that milieu. What methods of CAG selection suit India, depends on understanding and 
knowledge gained during the last decades on outcome of public finance management by executive 
and control mechanism adopted by legislatures. Certainly, such experiences have significantly been 
found disheartening that necessitates rejuvenating the system of CAG selection, incorporating 
‗selection criteria‘ in the selection process and reducing the executive influence.  The system could 
be that a committee having members from Parliament, Executive and Judiciary can be entrusted the 
task of CAG selection to recommend to President and this selection system should be formalized  by 
incorporating  relevant provisions in CAG Act and if need be, by tweaking the Constitution. 
Critical analysis in appointment of CAG 
There have always been allegations of various kinds when one is appointed to such 
constitutional body especially as there is no transparent system in selecting the incumbent. In the last 








 https://www.anao.gov.au/about/auditor-general-and-office, ( Apr;04,2017, 2:30PM ) 
17
 http://www.oag.govt.nz/about-us/our-governing-legislation/docs/public-audit-act-2001.pdf.( ( Apr;04,2017, 3:30PM ) 
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50 years only one officer from IAAS
18
 cadre that manages the Indian Audit and Account Department 
have been appointed as CAG and only IAS officers have been selected as Financial Watchdog. 
Era Sezhiyan, a former MP and erstwhile Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) 
1971-73 observed: ―It looks as though the Government has made an unwritten policy of appointing 
only IAS officers to head the Supreme Audit. Thus the Audit office has become another public sector 
enterprise to accommodate superannuating Government officials.19” 
As selection system is opaque, non-transparent, and unknown, the appointment of present 
CAG was challenged in the SC through  PIL by prominent personalities  having rich and long 
experience in public administration, army. Navy and audit; alleging ‗conflict of interest‘ and devoid 
of transparent selection procedure and seeking to set aside the appointment of CAG. 
Supreme Court rejected the PIL quoting the constitutional provisions and concluding that 
President has powers to appoint CAG on the advice of government and court could not interfere.
20
 
It is not the case that IAS officers can‘t and should not be selected and appointed as CAG.  
Although, the apex court rejected the plea citing the constitutional provisions, but the argument is that 
it would enhance the independence and confidence of CAG if executive formulates and formalizes a 
selection committee consisting of various stakeholders that can recommend nominations to President 
to appoint as CAG. 
Such an appointee will have confidence in one‘s appointment eliminating an iota of 
‗obligation of reciprocity‘ towards executive; and his audit reports would generate credibility and 
reliability among public and legislature.  In the past, unpalatable audit reports have been suspected to 
be politically motivated and it had been ‗alleged‘ that CAG had been working on behalf of opposition 
parties and, had political ambitions. Selection of CAG by certain kind of ‗Collegium‘ involving 
various stakeholders may eradicate such apprehensions.  
                                                          
18
 Indian Audit and Account Service. 
19
 Supra 14. 
20
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Prominent political leader, BJP leader L K Advani, while being in opposition, stated that ―the 
present selection process is vulnerable to "manipulation and partisanship," and advocated to introduce 
a broad-based Collegium system to appoint Election Commissioners and Comptroller and Auditor 
General as the existing system ‗solely on the advice of the Prime Minister, does not evoke confidence 
among the people.‘ that the Committee should comprise the Prime Minister as Chairman and the 
Chief Justice of India, the Law Minister and Leaders of Opposition in the Lok Sabha and Rajya 
Sabha as its members.
21
‖ 
This view was also supported by DMK chief M Karunanidhi that Committee should be 
constituted to select CEC and CAG. Similarly, former chief election commissioner, SY Quraishi 
calls for a Committee to appoint CEC, ECs terming the current system of appointment as flawed.
22
 
It definitely emerges that constitutional authority like CAG need to be selected and appointed 
in transparent manner by some sort of collegium that generates confidence in public, moreover 
especially when Government, no longer, exclusively utilizes the public resources alone; rather allows 
that the huge public resources are shared with private parties in various economic activities thereby 
necessitating close monitoring and evaluating of public finance management of Union and States. 
 
Constitutional Review of CAG 
Having experienced the Constitutional principles in practice after independence of the country 
and with the purpose of exploring what amendments in the constitution would be necessary so that 
the good governance and economic development can be fast-tracked, Government constituted a 
‗National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution (NCRWC)‘
23
 under the 
Chairmanship of Justice M N Venkatachaliah in February, 2000. NCRWC submitted its report on 31
st
 
March, 2002 and also interalia reviewed as to how the CAG is selected in the existing system and 
stated, in its report that swaying point was that ―appointment of the CAG should not be the exclusive 
preserve of the executive but a committee consisting of Prime Minister, Union Finance Minister, 
                                                          
21
 Advani proposes collegium system to appoint ECs, CAG. (Mar.12, 2017, 11:15 PM) 
http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/advani-proposes-collegium-system-to-appoint-ecs-cag/1/198878.html . 
22
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Speaker of the Lok Sabha, Leader of the Opposition, the Chairman of PAC should be empowered to 
make the appointment.‖
24
 Dr. B P Mathur, ex-deputy CAG while submitting a consultation paper to 
the Commission also expressed that ―it would be necessary to keep the Office of CAG outside the 




However, it is startling to note and beyond comprehension that the Commission felt 
differently and did not suggest such amendments in the Constitution stating in its recommendations 
that ―a healthy convention be developed to consult the Speaker of the Lok Sabha, before the 
Government decides on the appointment of the C&AG so that the views of the Public Accounts 
Committee are also taken into account.‖
26
 
Government has not even considered the ‗convention‘ suggested by NCRWC and went ahead 
in its own whimsical way in choosing the CAG. Revelations of various scams by the politico - 
bureaucratic nexus in the last decade would have definitely impacted the thought process of NCRWC 
regarding the selection of CAG.  Time is not far away when vigilant civil groups may certainly 
impress the government to broad base the selection of constitutional bodies including CAG and 
judiciary may  intervene in such appointments stipulating certain guidelines. Legal history has shown 
that law comes to rescue when executive fails in public aspiration. 
Conclusion: 
CAG can be a ‗Change Agent‘ in bringing transparent governance by divulging as to how and 
for what purpose public money and resources have been spent by executive. Such revelations 
regarding public finance management create public pressure on   the executive. Thus, CAG can be 
said to be ‗fifth pillar‘ of democracy, others being Legislature, Judiciary, Executive and Press. 
Therefore it needs no emphasis to submit that the appointing system of CAG cannot be left 
solely in the hands of executive. Appointing the CAG exclusively at the command of executive 
                                                          
24
. Dr. A. Surya Prakash, appointment of the CAG – some concerns, Vivekananda International Foundation, (Mar.15, 
2017), WWW.vifindia.org. 
25
  Dr. B.P. Mathur, Consultation Paper on Efficacy of Public Audit System in India, Report of the National Commission 
to Review the Working of the Constitution, Volume II, Book I. (Mar.12, 2017,10:05PM), 
http://lawmin.nic.in/ncrwc/finalreport/v2b1-11.htm. 
26
 Government of India, Report of NCRWC (Ministry of Law and Justice), (Para 5.16.3).  
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creates ‗conflict of interest‘ as CAG is to audit the expenditure of public fund appropriated to 
executive with the sanction of legislature, and to ascertain the accountability of the executive that 
appoints him. Appointing in such a manner is not in congruity necessitating change of selection 
method and there should be Collegium to choose the CAG and it should be formalized by legislation. 
One and half decade has passed since submission of NCRWC report and during this interlude, 
rampant misuse of public funds and resources have come to light by means of audit reports even 
influencing political temper of the masses. Hegemony of one party ruling has changed and multi-
party, opportunistic, unprincipled coalitions have come into existence  that make for unscrupulous 
nexus under political compulsion making public resources vulnerable to misuse. So,, if the 
Commission is to revisit the CAG selection procedure today, they would have positively rethought on 
its statement in ‗undermining of the Constitutional and moral authority of the Prime Minister‘
27
   In 
the present circumstances and experience gained in last 15 years on the misuse of public resources, 
Commission would link to their ‗feelings‘ to choose the CAG by Collegium system eliminating the 
role of executive supremacy. 
New economic development models-PPP model, profit sharing etc.- with widespread 
participation of private enterprises in the public affairs for fast growth has become imminent, it is 
appropriate and warranted that Government need to accept the original view of the commission that 
selection of CAG be outside the control of executive by incorporating the broad-based Collegium 
method in the legal frame work. 
Firstly, New Article 148(1A) may be inserted in the constitution that CAG shall be appointed 
by a Collegium and it can be approximately drafted as follows: 148(1A) The President shall appoint 
the CAG after obtaining recommendations of a Collegium, whose composition shall be established 
by an Act of Parliament.  
This constitutional amendment would facilitate introduction of the selection mode through a 
Collegium system by making changes in the CAG Act, 1971; and that should stipulate that the 
Collegium will consist of Prime Minister, Union Finance Minister, and Leader of Opposition in the 
Lower House, Chairman, PAC. Other features of committee system appointment as enumerated in 
CVC Act, 2003 can also be incorporated the   CAG Act, 1971. 





An International Refereed e-Journal 
                        (Peer Reviewed, Refereed & Open Access, Index, Journal of Law) 
Web: www.lrdjournal.com,    Email: journal1257@gmail.com 
 
[101] 
Vol. 1, Issue-III 
March 2017 
Chief Justice of India should also be included in this Collegium so that selection mode of 
CAG includes participation of all the three organs of state.   The one selected in such a manner would 
definitely generate public confidence in the office of CAG eliminating the political biasness as being 
raised by the executive when audit reports expose the mismanagement of public funds and resources. 
Time has come for judiciary to move from ‗Judicial Activism‘ to ‗Judicial Participation‘ in 
state affairs as far as appointment system of constitutional institutions are concerned. Judicial 
participation in the selection of CAG would not divest and dilute the power of ‗judicial review‘ 
vested in the judiciary. Judicial intervention as has been experienced in the case of Centre for PIL v. 
Union of India 
28
popularly known as CVC appointment case, when appointment of P.J. Thomas as 
CVC was rejected on the ground of violation of ‗institutional integrity‘; should make the government 
wiser enough to bring the required changes in the laws in establishing transparent and broad-based 
system in the selection mode of CAG.  
********************************* 
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